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CORPORATIONS: ATTORNEY-DIRECTOR-OFFICER AS
ALTER EGO OF UNDERCAPITALIZED CORPORATION
AS A CONCOMITANT of increased use of the corporate form of business,
attorneys have developed a common practice of accepting positions as
directors and officers in corporations wich,they form. Since no active
management is involved, these positions, normally accepted as a courtesy
to the incorporator-client and as a convenience to the lawyer, are cus-
tomarily labeled "dummy"' or "accommodating." 2 However, the law
traditionally recognizes only the active, managing officer or director,8
whose duties and liabilities are substantially defined; 4 special judicial
1 
"In common parlance, a dummy director is one who is a mere figurehead and in
effect discharges no duties." Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Bukvich, xoS Mont. 569, 572,
92 P.2d 316, 319 (1939) ; accord, Ashby v. Peters 128 Neb. 338, 341, 2S8 N.W. 639,
641 (1935); Hoopes v. Basic Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 679, 61 Ad. 979 (1905).
In a close corporation, deprivation of management talent has no practical effect,
since management by the entire board of directors is generally unwanted and avoided.
See i O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 3-1I-.391 5.0-.39 (z958); O'Neal, Protecting
Shareholders' Control Agreements Against Attack, 14 Bus. LAW. 184 (t958).
For reflections on the management functions of outside directors in large public
issue corporations, see Weinberg, A Corporation Director Looks at His Job, 27 HARv.
Bus. REV. 585 (1949); see also Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 1305, 1314 (1934).
2 See HENN, CORPORATIONS 187, 408 (1961); Note, A Defense of Non-Managing
Directors, 5 U. Cm. L. REv. 668 (1938). Another title suggested for the advisor-type
non-managing director is "consultant expert." See SAMUEL, SHAREHOLDERS' MONEY
124- (1933). Although the particular title used may vary, each is applicable, since the
lawyer does not actively manage, but rather assumes the position for the special purpose
of more easily supervising the legal aspects of his fledging corporate client during its
first days of existence, and possibly even after it has grown to full maturity. Benefits
to the corporation of this arrangement include primarily better legal services from its
counsel and, in the case of some close corporations, safe storage for corporate books,
records, and files.
"Theirs is not a mere position as sponsors or figureheads, devoid of responsibility."
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 156 (rev. ed. 1946). "A figurehead director is not
tolerated in this country." x HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICnE 527
(959). Accord, Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Bukvich, xo8 Mont. 569, 92 P.zd 36
(1939) ; Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N.W. 639 (935); Hoopes v. Basic Co.,
69 N.J. Eq. 679, 6i Atl. 979 (I905); People v. Central Fish Co., 117 App. Div. 77,
zox N.Y. Supp. ,xo8 (1907); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 6s (1938); see also Douglas,
supra note z; 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 668 (1938); 82 U. PA. L. REV. 364 (1934). For
a comparison with the English Companies Act of 1929, see SAMUEL, SHAREHOLDERS'
MONEY (1933); Douglas, supra note 1; 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 668, 671 (1938).
'" Management' may be defined as that body of men who, in law, have formally
assumed the duties of exercising domination over the corporate business and assets ...
Universally, under the American system of law, managers consist of a board of directors
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treatment is seldom accorded non-managing officers or directors.5 Not-
withstanding this traditional view, the accommodating attorney rarely
considers the possible risks of personal liability implicit in his assump-
tion of a courtesy position.
The California Supreme Court decision in Minton v. Cavaney
should serve as a caveat for anyone serving in an accommodating or
dummy capacity. In an action to enforce an unsatisfied wrongful death
judgment recovered against an undercapitalized corporation,7 an attor-
ney, claiming to have served only "in a temporary capacity as an
accommodation, ' 9 was found to be subject to liability as alter ego'0 of
and the senior officers of the corporation . . . ." BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220 (1932). Some states have enacted statutes
providing that directors shall be responsible for active management of corporate affairs.
See, e.g., CAL. COPP. CODE § Soo; N.Y. GEN. Co'. LAW § 27. However, "in the
main, the rules of conduct applicable to managements were developed out of the com-
mon law and not out of statute . . . ." BERLE & MEANS, p. Cit. supra at 221. See
also BALLANTINE CORPORATIONS 156-57 (rev. ed. x94.6); HENN, CORPORATIONS
§§ 231-36 (196.); 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACrICE § 431 (1959);
STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 151 (2d ed. 1949) i Dwight, Liability of Corporate Direc-
tors, 17 YALE L.J. 33 (1907); Feuer, Liabilities of Directors and Officers, 5 N.Y.L.F.
127, 235 (x959).
' But see Conaty v. Torghen, 46 R.I. 447, 453, 128 At. 338, 341 (1925), where
a judgment on a directed verdict was reversed because it was well known that the
defendant director-treasurer performed merely administrative functions, and therefore
the jury should be allowed to consider his particular duties when determining liability.
Cf. note 23 infra.
9 S6 Cal. 2d 597, 364 P.2d 4-73 (196).
'The Seminole Hot Springs Corporation had operated a public swimming pool
which it had leased from its owner. Although the articles of incorporation provided
for issuance of $700,000 worth of capital stock, none was ever issued. Minton v. Kraft,
x9o Cal. App. 2d 311, - , 12 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 (196i). Plaintiffs' daughter had
drowned while swimming in the pool, and in a wrongful death action against Seminole,
plaintiffs had recovered a sxo,ooo judgment. Since the corporation was without capital,
however, the judgment remained unsatisfied. 364 P.2d at 474.
" Subsequent to the commencement of action in the instant case, the defendant at-
torney died and the executrix of his estate was substituted as defendant. Ibid. How-
ever, in this note "defendant" will refer to the deceased attorney whose acts served as
the basis for litigation.
9 364 P.zd at 475.
"
0 When a court pierces the corporate veil, it generally characterizes the individual
defendant as a mere adjunct, agent, alter ego, cloak, cover, dry shell, tool, or other appro-
priate epithet suitable to the particular defendant. See LATTY, INTRODUCTION To BUSI-
NESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 42 (195 1); 5 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS
§ 1.09 (1958).
California previously adopted the alter ego characterization where "there is such a
unity of interest and ownership that the individuality, or separateness, of said person
and corporation has ceased, . .. [and] the facts are such that an adherence to the fiction
of separate existence of the corporation would.., sanction a fraud or promote injustice."
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the corporation.11 The supreme court dismissed defendant's "accommo-
dation" contention by adopting the trial court's finding that he was, in
fact, an active managing director,' 2 and by referring to a broad statute a
charging corporate directors with the responsibilities of management.
Noting that defendant had not claimed to be "a director with specialized
Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 487, 202 Pac. 673, 676 (1921). To support charac-
terization of defendant as alter ego in the instant case, the court relied upon (i) the
undisputed evidence that he was director, secretary, and treasurer of the clearly under-
capitalized corporation; (2) the inference that he was equitable owner of corporate
stock, based upon evidence that defendant, in his capacity as secretary of the corporation,
had signed a petition requesting permission from the California Corporations Commis-
sioner to issue three shares of stock, one of which he was to have received; and (3) the
inference that he was an active participant in the conduct of corporate business, as
demonstrated by storage of corporate records and receipt of corporate mail at de-
fendant's law olffce. Although these findings may not strictly qualify to show "such a
unity of interest and ownership" that the separateness of defendant and the corporation
had ceased to exist, the court explained that "the figurative terminology 'alter ego'
and 'disregard of the corporate entity' is generally used to refer to the various situa-
tions that are an abuse of the corporate privilege." 364 P.2d at 475.
"' The most common instances where the corporate entity has been disregarded are
where the corporation has been inadequately capitalized considering the magnitude and
nature of its activities; where money, assets, equipment, and employees of two corpora-
tions have been intermingled; where none of the corporate formalities have been fol-
lowed; and where there has been a holding out by the individual participants that they
are personally liable for corporate operations. See generally BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS § 122 (rev. ed. 1946); 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §§ 41-47
(perm. ed. 1931, Supp. 1961); HENN, CORPORATIONS 203 (1961); Horowitz, Ditre.
garding the Entity of Private Corporations, pt. z, 14 WASH. L. REV. 285 (939), pt.
2, 15 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1940); Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: 1 Study of The
One-Man Company, 5 H~Av. L. REv. 1373, 1402 (1938). For the classic statement
as to when the corporate veil will be pierced, see Sanborn, J., in United States v. Mil-
waukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).
" The supreme court thus vacated the district court of appeal's decision. The latter
court had found that defendant's acts merely constituted practicing law, since "the
evidence at most shows only a course of conduct consistent with the role of an attorney
in the formation and organization of a corporation." Minton v. Kraft, xo Cal. App.
ad 3ui, - , x2 Cal. Rptr. 86, 95 (196i). In reinstating the trial court's findings
of fact, the supreme court said, "the trial court was not required to believe his [de-
fendant's] statement that he was only a 'temporary' director and officer 'for accommo-
dation.' In any event it merely raised a conflict in the evidence that was resolved
adversely to defendant." 364 P.2d at 475. The dissenting opinion felt constrained
to call attention to the different result which would have been reached if the evidence
had shown defendant had merely been organizing the corporation. 364 P.2d at 477.
15 "[A]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under authority of, and the
business and affairs of every corporation shall be controlled by, a board of not less than
three directors." CAL. CORP. CODE § 8oo. The corporation in the instant case had
only three directors; thus, even if defendant had been found to have been an accommo-




duties,"1 the court found him subject to liability on the basis of the
general rule that once the corporate fiction has been disregarded, 15 the
equitable owners of an undercapitalized corporation are severally re-
sponsible for liabilities of the corporation. However, the court reversed
the case for relitigation on the issue of corporate negligence, since de-
fendant had not been a party to the previous action.'
Implicit in the holding in Cavaney was the court's recognition and
approval of pre-business "paper positions" assumed by strawmen solely
to effect compliance with required incorporation procedures. It is ju-
dicially well established that an attorney in organizing a corporation may
initially hold "accommodation" offices, receive qualifying shares of stock,
and perform any of the numerous functions necessary to organization
without assuming officer or director liability.17 As a result, in recent
years the statutory requirements for incorporation have been mechanis-
tically followed with only slight regard for the purposes of such re-
quirements. Positions of incorporators and initial directors have been
regarded merely as part of the ritual of corporate organization and have
not been taken seriously. Accordingly, no longer does the incorporator
regard himself as a sponsor of the proposed corporate idea, nor does the
initial "paper director" feel a responsibility to superintend the birth of
the corporation on a sound basis.
The judicial approval accorded the use of strawmen suggests that
the degree to which obligations in each stage of statutory incorporation
1 364 P.zd at 475.
'5 Automotriz del Golfo de California S. A. de C. V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792 ,
306 P.2d 1 (x957); Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d xo51 (1959). See also BALLANTINF, COR-
PORATIONS 302-03 (rev. ed. 1946); LAriN, CORPORATIONS 68-72 (596i) ; Frey,
Legal ,nalysis and The "De Facto" Doctrine, 'oo U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1176 (195±),
where the author found that tort actions against individual defendant participants are
virtually certain to succeed. But cf. Moe v. Harris, 142 Minn. 442, 172 N.W. 494
(igi9)
, 
where no contract liability was imposed upon individual participants despite
the fact that no capital stock had ever been paid in or even subscribed.
16 364 P.±d at 476; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84, comment e (1942). Plaintiffs
had selected the alter ego theory in an attempt to hold defendant liable without re-
litigating the claim, thereby avoiding the effect of the statute of limitations which had
run against the defendant. The net effect of reversal will be, therefore, to allow
defendant to avoid liability by pleading the statute of limitations in any subsequent
litigation against him.
" Recognition of the use of strawmen by the courts is well established. See Kardo
Co. v. Adams, ±3 Fed. 950 (6th Cir. 1916); Irvine Co. v. Bond, 74 Fed. 849, 852
(C.C.S.D. Cal. 1896); Donovan v. Purtell, 2x6 Ill. 629, 75 N.E. 334 (1905); State
v. Miner, 233 Mo. 312, 135 S.W. 483 (ig5). See generally HENN, CORPORATIONS
z87-89, 408 (1961); I HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 134, 135
(x959, Supp. 196i); I OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW §§ 179, 521 (1958).
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should be imposed on the participating parties might well be reviewed
by state legislatures. Some modern incorporation statutes have partially
solved this situation by reducing the number of incorporators and elimi-
nating paper directors in the incorporation process.' Hence the truly
interested parties tend to be revealed at the outset, and there is seldom
a "paper transfer" of corporate interest prior to beginning business.
These statutes do not, however, prohibit use of dummy incorporators
or guarantee that the corporation will not be undercapitalized or defec-
tive in some other respect. Perhaps state legislatures should consider
enacting statutes requiring the organizing parties to sponsor the cor-
porate idea in fact as well as in form, and assuring that the newly
formed entity is not a mere shell.'
Though, at present, the lawyer may serve as a dummy incorporator
and paper director, once the corporation has begun to engage in business,
the attorney must turn over his offices to the real parties in interest and
divest himself of all other vestiges of active participation.20 By retention
of office beyond the period of organizational formalities, the attorney
becomes a managing participant subject to all the duties and liabilities
of his position. Thus, by extending accountability for corporate manage-
ment to all officers and directors, the law tends to encourage and enforce
responsible participation.2 '
18 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101, 1o2 (953) (no requirement that initial
directors be named, but at least three incorporators must sign the articles of incorpora-
tion); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.2 (Supp. x961); Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.055 (Supp.
196o), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.3 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 401, 404
(not effective until April 1, 1963); WIs. STAT. § x80.44 (1957); see also HENN,
CORPORTONS §§ 129, 130 (:96:); x HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 134
, 
135 (x959, Supp. 1961); 1 OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § t79
(1958) ; Latty, Powers, & Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina Business Cor-
poration Actl, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26 (x954) ; Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legis-
jation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1291 (:952); Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern In.
corporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 305 (:937).
19 Local bar associations also might consider sanctioning those attorneys who know-
ingly organize defective corporations.
" If the statutory process for incorporation requires "paper meetings" of the in-
corporators and board of directors, appropriate resignations are customarily tendered
before such meetings. If no formal meetings are required, as is the case in some modern
incorporations statutes, turnover is normally effected at a similarly appropriate time
before the business begins to function as a mature corporate entity. See HENN, COR-
PORATIONS 187-89, 408 (:961); I HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 134, 135 (1959, Supp. :96i); I OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW §§ :79, 521
(1958).
't "Prominenf men cannot safely lend their names as directors for the sake of prestige
and advertising value to the ddmpany, upon an understanding that they need not take
any part in management and supervision." BALLANTINE, CORPoRATIONS, r56 (ri,: ed.
(Vol. z96a: 4o
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Tempering this general rule of participant accountability, however,
there has been some support for legal recognition of the non-managing
director.2 Moreover, varying degrees of individual liability occasion-
ally may be inferred from the apparent reluctance of some courts to
impose the full burdens of personal liability equally upon all directors
and officers.23 Indeed, an aspect of this reluctance may be reflected
in the instant case. By specifically noting that defendant did not claim
to be "a director with specialized duties,"24 the court implied that an
attorney, who continues to serve as a director after the corporation is
engaging in business but who confines his activities solely to consulta-
tion on and handling of the legal aspects and problems of the cor-
poration, might be vindicated from personal liability provided he had
not been derelict in his specialized duty.
The dearth of cases involving attorneys acting as directors and offi-
cers25 indicates that the characteristics of such non-managing participa-
tion will be seldom litigated. Consequently, the busy lawyer may feel
1946) ; accord, Dwight, supra note 4. For a critical treatment of the titled non-
managing directors under the British Companies Act and a novel suggested solution, see
SAMUEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 111-24.
22 See STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 646-56 (2d ed. 1949); Douglas, supra note x, at
1312-14; Dwight, supra note 4. For the special situation of the investment banker,
see BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1953); and concerning the "business con-
nection" bank director, see BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 231 n.16 (1932).
, See Bates v. Dresser, 151 U.S. 524 (i91o) (bank president held liable for failure
to discover embezzlement by employee, while directors were vindicated); Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (receiver of insolvent corporation had not
satisfied the burden of showing that defendant director could have prevented corporate
insolvency); Allied Freightways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950)
(wife who was dummy director of insolvent trucking company excused from liability
for mismanagement when her husband wrongfully disbursed corporate funds in the
exercise of his office as president); Wallach v. Billings, 277 III. 218, 115 N.E. 382
(1917) (non-resident director of Chicago bank exonerated from liability since his sole
function was as an out-of-state "contact" agent). See also BAKER; & CARY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 393-416 (3d ed. abr. 1959); Cushing, The Liability of
The Inactive Corporate Director, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 18 (i908). For a concise sum-
mary of flexible liability standards, see 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 668, 671-72 (1938).
t 364 P.2d at 475.
sResearch has failed to reveal any cases turning on the question of whether an
accommodating attorney who is a non-managing officer or director of a corporation
which is already engaging in business will be given special judicial protection from
individual liability. The decision in the instant case, however, clearly settles the law in
California that an attorney acting as a non-managing accommodating director is in-
cluded within the scope of the statute imposing duties and liabilities of active manage-
ment upon the directors of a corporation. See 364 P.2d at 475-76; note 13 supra.
Concerning imposition of liability, see note 13 supra.
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that the inconveniences of the suggested approach outweigh the benefits
to be realized and conclude that an expenditure of his time is not war-
ranted. The Cavaney case, however, dramatically demonstrates that
the lawyer may be subject to considerable risk of personal liability.
Thus efforts to preclude such liability clearly merit serious consideration.
Close scrutiny of corporate legal affairs by the attorney seems reasonable
as a fair price for the convenience and protection afforded by a specialized
duties position. 6
The holding in and the implications from Cavaney suggest that a
lawyer should determine whether the courts of his state might recog-
nize any position similar to the specialized duties director. If there are
either no indications or only unfavorable implications relative to state
judicial recognition of such positions, and if the risk of liability is con-
siderable, perhaps the attorney should consider refusing to "accommo-
date" after completion of organizational formalities, even at the pros-
pect of losing a client. However, if initial determinations support a
reasonable inference that special treatment may be afforded, the lawyer
should then balance the responsibilities of active legal supervision he
would have to assume against the benefits he would derive from such
a position. Until the courts and legislatures establish more explicit
bases, perhaps common sense and personal experience, coupled with a
through investigation of the relevant factors, are the best guide lines
available.
"' See Weinberg, supra note x.
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